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Abstract
In this paper we study the effects of bounded rationality in mechanism design prob-
lems. We model bounded rationality by assuming that in the presence of an incentive
compatible mechanism, players behave as if their types were in a δ-neighborhood of their
true types. In our results, we explore what are the effects of such bounded rationality in
the outcomes of the mechanism design problem. To such end, we characterize the social
choice functions that are robust to the δ-perturbations in the sense that the designers’ loss
is at most of order δk for a certain k. A notable finding is that in quasi-linear utilitarian
environments the designer’s loss is of order of δ2. We illustrate the applicability of our
results by means of examples.
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1 Introduction
Consider the classic mechanism design problem of providing a public good. In this problem,
the designer wants to choose how much of a public good to provide without knowing the
private valuations of the beneficiaries of the public good, i.e. the players. Depending on
the specifics of the problem, a mechanism usually exists such that players have incentives to
truthfully reveal their true valuations to the designer, so that the designer can then choose the
optimal quantity of the public good to provide the players with. In the classic mechanism
design literature, such mechanism relies on the ability of players to behave rationally, i.e.
players reveal their true valuations because that is how they maximize their payoffs given
their belief that all other players are rational and truthful.
However, in many real life situations players may not behave fully rational. This may
be for a variety of reasons, like computational constraints, memory limitations or because
players make mistakes. If it can be the case that players are not rational, the designer may
want to have a measure on how such irrationalities could affect the alternatives implemented
by a certain mechanism. The purpose of this paper is to study how are the outcomes of the
mechanism design problem affected when players are not fully rational.
We model bounded rationality by assuming that if a mechanism is in place such that
players have incentives to truthfully reveal their types when all other players reveal their
types (a mechanism that is incentive compatible), players may misrepresent their types. For
instance, in a public good problem a player may report a valuation that is different than his
true valuation even if the mechanism in place is incentive compatible and he believes that
all other players will be truthful. A player may misreport his true type if, for instance, he
simply makes a mistake.1
The way players misreport their types borrows from the ideas of robust control (see, for
instance, Zhou et al (1995)).2 We assume that for any given mechanism players behave in a
rational way as if their types were somewhere in a δ-neighborhood with δ > 0 of their true
types. This captures the idea that the designer may be missing important information on
how players behave because of their limited rationality. The designer would like to know how
the alternatives implemented by each mechanism are affected by these δ-perturbations. To
this end, the designer is endowed with a loss function that evaluates the differences between
any two alternatives given the true types of players.
1This has been shown to be experimentally the case in Moffatt and Peters (2001) among others. We
elaborate on this literature later on.
2For references of robust control methods and its application to economics see Hansen and Sargent (2001),
Hansen and Sargent (2007) or Williams (2008) for an overview. Also related is the literature on mechanism
design and signal processing, see Serpedin et al (2012) among others.
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Within this context, we say that a social choice function is k-robust if the maximum loss
when players misreport their types is of order δk with k ≥ 1. Evidently, higher k means that
the social choice function is more robust to the δ-perturbations, as the loss vanishes quickly
when the size of the perturbation δ becomes small. In this paper we characterize the social
choice functions that are k-robust, and obtain two main results:
First (Theorem 1), we find that in quasi-linear utilitarian environments, i.e. environments
where the role of the designer is to maximize the sum of the (quasi-linear) utility of players
and where the loss function is given by the differences in sums of utilities, all social choice
functions are 2-robust. This means that the maximum loss caused by the δ-perturbations is
of order δ2. In a nutshell, the reason why social choice functions in quasi-linear utilitarian
environments are 2-robust is that in these settings the alternative to be implemented by the
social choice function is calculated with a first order condition. Hence, small changes in the
alternative chosen do not affect the value of the objective function (first derivative equals
zero). Therefore, the perturbations in players’ type only have a second (and above) order
effect.
Second (Theorem 2), we find that how robust a social choice function is is linked to the
concept of local Ho¨lder continuity, which is a generalization of local Lipschitz continuity.
Not surprisingly, a robust social choice function is one where the alternatives implemented
do not change dramatically when the types of players are misreported slightly. This idea of
continuity is translated in terms of local Ho¨lder continuity. The usefulness of this result lies
in the fact that for understanding how robust a certain social choice function is one simply
has to explore its degree of local Ho¨lder continuity. A direct consequence of this is that the
only social choice functions that exhibit maximum robustness to perturbations (∞-robust
social choice functions) are those that are locally constant, i.e. the alternative implemented
by the social choice function is constant in the neighborhood of players’ true types. There
are several examples of settings where the designer may use a locally constant social choice
function, from auctions to school choice problems. In all these settings the irrationality of
players modeled as δ-perturbations of their reported type does not have any impact on the
alternatives implemented by a mechanism.
We illustrate the applicability of our results in two examples: the public good game in
Bergemann and Morris (2009) and a single unit auction between two bidders. In the public
good game in Bergemann and Morris (2009), the designer has to choose how much of a
public good to provide the players with. Since the optimal size of public good investment
is computed by a first order condition, the social choice function in this case is 2-robust
for the reasons discussed above. In the single unit auction example, we show that bounded
rationality modeled as perturbations to the bidders true valuations creates no loss for the
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designer. Indeed, since the role of the designer in this case is to award the item to the bidder
with the highest valuation, a positive but small enough perturbation in bidders’ valuations
has no effect on who the item should be allocated to.
This paper contributes to the analysis of robust mechanism design problems. Previous lit-
erature has looked at robust mechanism design from the perspective of the knowledge players
have about the type space (Bergemann and Morris (2005)), the relationship between domi-
nant strategies and implementation (Bergemann and Morris (2009) and Yamashita (2012))
and the designers’ use of almost optimal social choice functions (Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris
(2011)). Other papers that have looked at the issue of robustness in mechanism design focus
on the phenomenon of bounded rationally with adaptive players (see, for instance, Cabrales
(1999) or Mathevet (2010)) or with “faulty” players (see Eliaz (2002)). Our paper differs
from this strand of literature in that we look at the problem of robust mechanism design
from a different angle; we study robust mechanism design when players are bounded rational
in that they misreport their types even if and incentive compatible mechanism is in place.
Another related paper is that of Carroll (2012), in which players are constrained in how
they can behave: a player can only report a type that is similar to his true type. The
author then shows than in the presence of this limitation the designer can focus only on
local incentive constraints. Our paper is different from Carroll (2012) in that players are not
strategic in the way they misreport. On the contrary, misreports arise as mistakes. Thus,
the designer must take into account all the possible deviations within a certain neighborhood
of the players’ true types.
We introduce misreports by assuming that players behave as if their types where in a δ-
neighborhood of their true type. We argued that this had the interpretation of players making
mistakes. The motivation for the way we introduce bounded rationality is that it has been
shown experimentally that such mistakes (often referred to as trembles) are indeed observed
with real life subjects, and that incorporating trembles into the econometric model improves
its fit to experimental data (see, for instance, Bardsley and Moffatt (2007) or Bardsley et al
(2009) Chapter 2.9).3
In the paper we deal mostly with small misreports (δ sufficiently small) as if the misreport
is due to bounded rationality then small mistakes are more likely to be made than big
mistakes. The designer considers all the possible small misreports and will like to know how
a social choice function performs in the presence of them. If big misreports are allowed, then
3A difference between the experimental evidence and our model is that experimental papers consider
trembles as a situation where the player randomizes over all possible actions where we consider trembles as
randomizing in the neighborhood of their type, this is motivated by the fact that small mistakes are more
likely than bigger ones.
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a setting where the designer considers them all seems less appropriate than a setting where
the designer considers some misreports more likely than others. If the designer considers the
possibility of big misreports in a way that players choose their misreports strategically then
we are back to the classical mechanism design problem, where the role of the designer is to
set up the appropriate incentive compatibility constraint. Carroll (2012) deals with a setting
where there can only be small misreports but these are strategic, players choose what they
misreport but they are constrained to report something close to the truth. The present paper
deals with a setting where misreports are small but, crucially, they are non-strategic and,
thus, the designer has to consider all possible small misreports.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model while we present
our main result in Section 3. In Section 4 we relax the assumptions needed for our main
result and present a full characterization of k-robust social choice functions. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
An environment is a tuple (N,X,Θ, u, P ) where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, X is the
set of alternatives, Θ = {Θ1, . . . ,Θn} where Θi is the set of possible types of player i ∈ N ,
and u = (u1, . . . , un) where ui : X × Θi → R is the utility function of player i ∈ N . The
function P : Θ → [0, 1] is a probability measure on Θ and represents the common prior on
the distribution of types: P (θ) is the probability that players’ types are given by θ ∈ Θ. Each
player knows his own type and player i of type θi ∈ Θi holds a probabilistic belief P (θ−i|θi)
over the types of other players θ−i ∈ Θ−i = ×j∈Nr{i}Θj .
A social choice function f : Θ → X associates with each profile of types θ ∈ Θ an
alternative f(θ) ∈ X. Given a profile of types θ, a loss function lθ : X × X → R+ is a
mapping from a pair of alternatives to the positive reals with lθ(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ X
and lθ(x, y) = lθ(y, x) ≥ 0 for all x, y ∈ X. In mathematical terms, {lθ}θ∈Θ is a collection of
metrics on X where the properties of sub-additivity and the identity of indiscernibles need not
be satisfied. The social choice function f represents what the designer wants to implement
given the players’ types while the loss functions {lθ}θ∈Θ will be used to measure the designer’s
loss, given the players’ true types, between what he wants to implement and what has been
implemented instead.
A mechanism is a pair (M, g) with M = ×i∈NMi where Mi is player’s i set of messages
and g : ×i∈NMi → X is the allocation rule.
4 An environment together with a mechanism
4Notice that we only consider deterministic mechanisms. This is without loss of generality for the following
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(M, g) induce a Bayesian game G(M,g). A strategy profile s is given by s = ×i∈Nsi where si
is the strategy of player i and it is given by si : Θi →Mi.
Let s∗(θ) be a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of G(M,g) when players’ types are given by
θ ∈ Θ.5 The profile of strategies s∗(θ) summarizes the players’ behavior that the designer
considers as salient. Acknowledging that players may not be fully rational in several dimen-
sions, the designer conjectures that each player chooses a strategy misrepresenting his type.
In particular, the designer believes that players’ strategies belong to the set s∗(Bδ(θ)) where
Bδ(θ) ⊂ Θ is the ball of radius δ > 0 around θ given some metric d. That is, according to
the designer, players behave as if their types where in a δ-neighborhood of their true types.
This is how the designer acknowledges that players may not be fully rational. Players are not
aware of these perturbations, they simply choose a strategy in s∗(Bδ(θ)). Similarly, players
do not anticipate that other players also suffer from the δ-perturbations.6
This paper uses mainly two sets of metrics: one set is singleton and given by the metric
d on Θ and another set is given by the metrics {lθ}θ∈Θ on X. The former set of metrics is
meant to specify how distances in players types are measured while the latter set of metrics
specifies how differences in alternatives are evaluated by the designer. Both of these two sets
of metrics are given exogenously.
An obvious alternative to the way we model players’ bounded rationality is to assume
that the strategies players choose lie in Bδ(s
∗(θ)), i.e. players choose their strategies in the
δ-neighborhood of the equilibrium strategies. Such representation of limited rationality has
several conceptual problems that arise from the fact that the designer is the one that chooses
the mechanism (M, g). Given that the designer is the one that chooses (M, g), he is in effect
choosing the space of messages M and also its metric. Hence, the designer is indirectly
choosing the set Bδ(s
∗(θ)) and, thus, he can choose a metric such that Bδ(s
∗(θ)) = s∗(θ)
(which can be achieved with the discrete metric, for instance). This would mean that in
effect the designer is eliminating his acknowledgment of the limited rationality of players.
Given that we want to model the designers’ problem when he accepts that players may be
not be fully rational, he should not be allowed to ignore the inherent uncertainty that comes
reason: a requirement for k-robustness will be that a mechanism exists that implements the social choice
function f . Since f is deterministic, such mechanism must also be deterministic.
5That is, s∗ is the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of G(M,g), which prescribes what each player plays in equi-
librium depending on his type, and s∗(θ) are the strategies actually played in such equilibrium when the
realization of players’ types is given by θ ∈ Θ. This abuse of notation should lead to no confusion.
6Note that we implicitly assume that players are able to “calculate” the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strate-
gies s∗. In this paper, players’ bounded rationality implies that they unknowingly may mistake their own
types. However, they behave rationally given their possibly mistaken types and their potentially wrong belief
that other players do not mistake their types. This is to keep the setting as close as possible to the classical
rational setting while still being able to study the effects of bounded rationality as introduced in this paper.
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from such bounded rationality. In our definition of how the designer introduces the possibility
of not fully rational players, the designer believes that players choose strategies as if their
types where somewhere in Bδ(θ), which is a set that follows from the set of players’ types Θ
and its metric d, both of which are given exogenously.7
If players follow strategies s in the game G(M,g) and the social choice function is f , the
maximum loss for a given θ ∈ Θ and δ > 0 is given by maxθ′∈Bδ(θ) lθ(g(s(θ
′)), f(θ)). Classical
mechanism design sets δ = 0 (i.e. Bδ(θ) = θ) and requires that there exists a mechanism
(M, g) and an equilibrium s∗(θ) of G(M,g) such that g(s
∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, i.e.
maximum loss is zero.
We are now ready to introduce the measure of robustness used in this paper:
Definition 1. A social choice function f is k-robustly implementable (or simply k-robust) if
there exists a mechanism (M, g) such that:
(i) The mechanism (M, g) implements f in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium: for all θ ∈ Θ
there exists a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium s∗(θ) of G(M,g) such that g(s
∗(θ)) = f(θ).
(ii) The mechanism (M, g) bounds the maximum loss by a factor of δk: for all θ ∈ Θ there
exist a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ),
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk
with k ≥ 1.
Requirement (i) of Definition 1 requires f to be implementable in the classical sense, and
it implies that the social choice function is Bayesian incentive compatible: for each player i
and for each type θi we have that∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)dP (θ−i|θi) ≥
∫
θ−i∈Θ−i
ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi)dP (θ−i|θi),
for all θ′i ∈ Θi. In particular, truth-telling is an equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism
(Θ, f).
Requirement (ii) states that if a social choice function is k-robust then the loss due to
the bounded rationality of players cannot be of a factor greater than δk. That is, for a given
θ there exists a δˆ such that for all δ < δˆ the loss is proportional to δk. The role of δˆ is to
7Another alternative to model bounded rationality would be to perturb the utility function of players. This
is equivalent to our formulation by which players’ types are perturbed under some assumptions on the utility
function. Furthermore, note that the designer’s loss function is given exogenously, i.e. he has no control over
it. Thus, choosing the message space and its metric is not equivalent to choosing a loss function.
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limit the maximum δ, i.e. the loss may not be proportional to δk when δ is too large. Since
the target of this paper is to deal with small mistakes it makes sense to focus on situations
where δ is sufficiently small. The role of c is that the loss needs to be (at most) proportional
to δk, but could be anything as long as it less than cδk for fixed c. This means that, for
instance, for a k-robust social choice function and a given θ, we have limδ→0
cδk
lθ(f(θ),f(θ′))
≤ 1
and limδ→0
cδk+n
lθ(f(θ),f(θ′))
= 0 for any n = 1, 2, . . ..
Note that effectively the designer is following a maxmin approach. In particular, k-
robustnes implies that
max
θ′∈Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk,
and the designer would like to know what is the minimum δk (maximum k) such the inequality
above is true. The maxmin approach is in line with previous economic models using the robust
control framework (see Hansen and Sargent (2001) and the reference to Gilboa and David
Schmeidler (1989) herein).
An alternative to requirement (ii) is that the constant c and degree of robustness k are
independent on θ. The consequences of adding this extra requirement are no trivial.8 It
turns out that adding such “uniform” requirement is too restrictive; indeed, it can be shown
that in this case the only social choice functions that would be k-robust with k > 1 are those
that are constant everywhere. Thus, having the constant c and the degree of robustness k
independent on θ would reduce significantly our ability to classify social choice functions into
different categories according to how robust they are.
Note that as opposed to previous work on robust mechanism design (see Bergemann and
Morris (2005) and (2008) among others), we are not concerned with the knowledge players
have about the type space. In our paper, the designer is the one who is concerned with the
type space of players and, in particular, with the δ-perturbations around the true types.
Given that the purpose of this paper is to study mechanism design in the presence of
bounded rational players, we focus on social choice functions that are implementable in the
classical sense. That is, we only consider social choice functions that satisfy condition (i) in
Definition 1. There are several assumptions that could be made on f that guarantee that
the social choice function can be implemented. Here we do not assume any conditions in
particular but simply that f is implementable by some mechanism.
8As one would expect when comparing the definition of continuity versus uniform continuity, for instance.
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2.1 Example: Provision of a Public Good
In order to illustrate the definition of k-robustnes and how it applies to a particular problem
consider the public good example in Bergemann and Morris (2009) with no interdependent
utility functions.9
The set of players is N = {1, 2, 3} and the set of possible allocations in this setting is
given by X = R+ × R
3 where if x = (x0, x1, x2, x3) then x0 units of the public good are
provided and the contribution of agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is given by xi. The cost of providing an
amount x0 of the public good is given by
1
2x
2
0. The objective of the designer is to choose
x = (x0, x1, x2, x3) such that the sum of the utility of all players is maximized. The player’s
types are given by Θ = ×3i=1Θi where for i = {1, 2} we have that Θi = R is endowed with
the Euclidean distance and Θ3 = {0}. Note that for any θ ∈ Θ, any δ > 0 and any θ
′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
it is true that θ′3 = θ3.
Player’s i ∈ {1, 2} utility function is given by
ui (x, θi) = θix0 − xi
and player’s 3 utility function is given by
u3 (x, θ3) = −
1
2
x20 + x1 + x2.
Note that player 3 simply represents the designer’s wealth.10
The designer chooses
x0 = argmax
x0
(θ1 + θ2)x0 −
1
2
x20
and, hence, we have that x0 = θ1 + θ2. As argued in Bergemann and Morris (2009), this
amount of public good is implementable by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves transfers given by xi =
−12θ
2
i for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, the social choice function is given by f(θ) = (θ1+θ2,
1
2θ
2
1,
1
2θ
2
2,
1
2θ
2
1+
1
2θ
2
2).
As the target of the designer is to maximize the utility of agents net of the cost of the public
good, one reasonable assumption about how he compares two different levels of provision of
the public good x0 and y0 is that the designer uses the expression∣∣∣∣(θ1 + θ2)x0 − 12x20 −
(
(θ1 + θ2)y0 −
1
2
y20
)∣∣∣∣ ,
9This means that the parameter γ in Bergemann and Morris (2009) is set to 0.
10In Bergemann and Morris (2009) player 3 is not needed. We introduce player 3 so that we can apply the
results presented later on to this example but player 3 plays no role in the strategic incentives of the other
players nor in those of the designer: player 3 does not affect the social choice function nor the transfers, and
his reported type has no effect on the alternative that is implemented.
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which we shall refer to as lθ(x, y), the loss function.
11
The social choice function f is k-robust if there exists a mechanism (M, g) and an equi-
librium s∗ of G(M,g) such that for all θ ∈ Θ there exist a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 for which if
θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) with δ ∈ (0, δˆ) then
(i) lθ(f(θ), g(s
∗(θ))) = 0, and
(ii) lθ(f(θ), g(s
∗(θ′))) < cδk.
Requirement (i) states that if players do indeed behave accroding to their true types then
the mechanism (M, g) implements f(θ). Requirement (ii) states that if players behave as if
their types were in a δ-neighborhood of their true type then the loss for the designer is less
than cδk.
3 Results
Before we dwell into the characterization of k-robust social choice functions, the following
lemma, which follows from the revelation principle type of result presented in Proposition 1
in the Appendix, allows us to focus only on direct mechanism where players truthfully report
their types.12
Lemma 1. A social choice function f is k-robust if and only if and for all θ ∈ Θ there exists
a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ),
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) < cδk.
Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that if a certain mechanism allows f to satisfy the definition
of k-robustness for a given k then the direct mechanism (Θ, f) also allows the loss to be
bounded by a factor of δk (with the same constant c). An implication of this is that the
designer does not choose a different mechanism than the one he would choose if he ignored
the limited rationality of players. This is an implication of the condition (i) in the definition of
k-robustness. Relaxing condition (i) in the definition of k-robustness could allow the designer
to choose mechanism that, although not being incentive compatible, may create a smaller
loss for some values of δ than an incentive compatible mechanism. We believe that incentive
compatibility must be a requirement on the social choice function because players may still
11Note that the the loss function is defined as a mapping from the allocations x and y although in this
example it only depends on the level of provision of public good x0 and y0 as the other components of x and
y cancel out.
12Note that players truthfully reporting types simply means that s(θ) = θ, yet in general s(Bδ(θ)) 6= s(θ).
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behave according to their true types (this is a possibility with the δ-perturbations), and as
such the mechanism must be able to implement the same alternatives it was first set out to
implement in the absence of bounded rationality.
Once we have established that the presence players’ limited rationality does not make the
designer to change the mechanism he chooses, a question that arises is that of the character-
ization of the loss induced by the δ-perturbations, i.e. the characterization of k-robust social
choice functions for all k. Our analysis continues by exploring this issue.
3.1 Quasi-linear Utilitarian Environments
We continue the study of k-robust social choice functions by generalizing the public good
example presented in the previous section. In particular, in this section we focus on quasi-
linear utilitarian environments: environments where the goal of the designer is to choose an
allocation that maximizes the aggregate sum of the utility of all players, and where the utility
of players is linear in wealth. Specifically, we assume the following:
Assumption 1. Alternatives are of the form x = (x0, x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X = R
n+1 where x0
represents a certain choice of the designer and xi with i ∈ N are the transfers of each player.
Moreover,
ui(x, θi) = vi(x0, θi)−
n∑
j=1
aijxj
with vi : R×Θi → R and aij ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N .
13
The next assumption specifies how the social choice function selects among different al-
ternatives and how the designer evaluates losses.
Assumption 2. Define e = (1, 0 . . . , 0). For all θ ∈ Θ and all x, y ∈ X:
- ef(θ) = argmaxx0∈R
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi),
- lθ(x, y) = |
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi)−
∑n
i=1 vi(y0, θi)|.
That is, the designer would like to choose x0 in order to maximize the sum of the utilities
of all players ignoring the transfers.14 On top of that, the loss function measures the welfare
13Note that the utility of a player can depend on the transfers of another player, yet a possibility is also
aii 6= 0 and aij = 0 for i 6= j.
14Transfers are only used to allow the mechanism employed by the designer to be incentive compatible. For
instance, in the public good example we present in Section 2.1 transfers are used to finance the public good.
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difference between two alternatives, quantified as the difference in the sum of the utility of
x0 for each player.
15
We also impose some structure on the utility functions and the social choice functions.
Firstly, we assume that for all players’ types θ ∈ Θ the term
∑n
i=1 vi coincides with its
analytic form (Taylor expansion) around ef(θ). In particular:
Assumption 3. For all θ ∈ Θ and all x0 ∈ R the term
∑n
i=1 vi is such that:
n∑
i=1
vi(x0, θi) =
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(x0 − ef(θ))
j
j!
.
Assumption 3 is satisfied if, for instance, the function
∑n
i=1 vi is a polynomial in x0 where
the coefficients can be any finite function of the types of players Θ.
Finally, we assume that the choice of the designer, ef , is Lipschitz continuous:
Assumption 4. There exists a k > 0 such that for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ we have that
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣ ≤ kd(θ′, θ).
The fact that ef is Lipschitz continuous does not impose any assumption on the other
components of f , i.e. Assumption 4 only deals with the first component of f . Moreover,
Assumption 4 does not impose any restriction on how the designer evaluates loses. For
utilitarian environments, the only assumption we make about how the designer evaluates
loses is Assumption 2.
The structure imposed by Assumptions 1-4 is in line with settings commonly found in the
literature. We prove later on that the public good example presented in section 2.1 satisfies
Assumptions 1-4.
Note that Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that the designer selects the optimal x0 using a
first order condition, i.e. ef maximizes the sum of utilities by differentiating and setting the
derivative equal to zero: for all θ ∈ Θ,
∂
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂ef(θ)
= 0. (1)
Moreover, as by Assumption 2 it is true that ef(θ) = argmaxx0∈R
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi), then∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi) must be bounded for all θ. Hence, for all θ ∈ Θ and all x0 ∈ R there exists
an upper bound r > 0 such that
r > sup
θ∈Θ,j∈N+
∣∣∣∣∂
j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
1
j!
∣∣∣∣ . (2)
15We assume that ef(θ) is unique in order to simplify the exposition but our results still follow if the
maximization problem argmaxx0∈R
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi) has several solutions.
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We have the following result:
Theorem 1. Social choice functions in quasi-linear utilitarian environments (Assumptions
1-4) are 2-robust.
Proof. We have that in a quasi-linear utilitarian environment for all θ′, θ ∈ Θ:
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(
vi(ef(θ
′), θi)− vi(ef(θ), θi)
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ)), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(ef(θ′)− ef(θ))j
j!
−
n∑
i=1
vi(ef(θ), θi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=1
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(ef(θ′)− ef(θ))j
j!
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Using the equality in equation (1) with the upper bound r in equation (2) gives:
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
j=2
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
(ef(θ′)− ef(θ))j
j!
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ r
∞∑
j=2
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣j .
By Assumption 4 there exists a k > 0 such that for all θ ∈ Θ and all δ > 0 we have that
for all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣ ≤ kd(θ′, θ)
< kδ.
Choose some δˆ ∈ (0, 1
k
) such that (kδ)2 >
∑∞
j=3(kδ)
j for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) (for example,
δˆ < 12k ). We have that for all θ ∈ Θ and all θ
′ ∈ Bδ(θ) with δ ∈ (0, δˆ):
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) < r
∞∑
j=2
(kδ)j
< 2rk2δ2.
Therefore, f is 2-robust.
Theorem 1 shows that all social choice function in quasi-linear utilitarian environments
are 2-robust. The intuition for this result is that if the alternative to be implemented by the
social choice function is calculated with a first order condition, then infinitesimal changes in
the alternative chosen do not change the value of the objective function (derivative equals
13
zero). Hence, if the types of players are perturbed slightly and the alternative implemented
does not change much as a result (ef is Lipschitz continuous), the first order effect of this
perturbation (the term of order δ) is zero, and only the second order effect (the term of order
δ2) matters.
3.2 Example Revisited: Provision of a Public Good
We now show that the public good example presented in 2.1 satisfies Assumptions 1-4. If
we define vi (x, θi) = θix0 for i ∈ {1, 2} and v3 (x, θ3) = −
1
2x
2
0, and set a11 = a22 = 1,
a12 = a13 = a21 = a23 = 0 and a31 = a32 = −1 then Assumption 1 is satisfied.
We have that x0 = ef(θ) maximizes
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi). Moreover, the designer evaluates
loses according to the loss function lθ(x, y) =
∣∣(θ1 + θ2)x0 − 12x20 − ((θ1 + θ2)y0 − 12y20)) | =
|
∑n
i=1 vi(x0, θi)−
∑n
i=1 vi(y0, θi)) |. Therefore, Assumption 2 is also satisfied.
Under mechanism (Θ, f), if players report types θ then we have that x0 = ef(θ) and,
hence, we can write
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi) = (θ1+ θ2)ef(θ)−
1
2(ef(θ))
2. Moreover, it is true that
∂2
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂2ef(θ)
= −1 and
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
= 0
for all j ≥ 3. Hence, for all θ′ ∈ Θ:
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)|j
j!
= (θ1 + θ2)ef(θ)−
1
2
(ef(θ))2 −
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)|2
2
.
Since
∣∣ef(θ′)− ef(θ)∣∣ = ∣∣(θ′1 + θ′2)− (θ1 + θ2)∣∣ ,
we have that
∞∑
j=0
∂j
∑n
i=1 vi(ef(θ), θi)
∂jef(θ)
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)|j
j!
=
1
2
(θ1 + θ2)
2 −
|(θ′1 + θ
′
2)− (θ1 + θ2)|
2
2
= (θ1 + θ2)(θ
′
1 + θ
′
2)−
1
2
(θ′1 + θ
′
2)
2
=
n∑
i=1
vi(ef(θ
′), θi).
Therefore, Assumption 3 is satisfied. Finally, since for all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we have that
|ef(θ′)− ef(θ)| ≤ |θ′1−θ1|+|θ
′
2−θ2| ≤ 2δ, the social choice function f is Lipschitz continuous.
Hence, Assumption 4 is also satisfied. This implies that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied and
by Theorem 1 we have that f is 2-robust.
Remark 1. The setting in the Provision of a Public Good example (section 2.1) is quasi-
linear utilitarian and, hence, by Theorem 1 the social choice function f is 2-robust.
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4 Other Environments
Next we ask the question of what social choice functions are k-robust when no particular as-
sumption on structure of the environment is made, i.e. Assumptions 1-4 need not be satisfied.
One might guess that k-robust social choice functions should exhibit some type of conti-
nuity, so that a perturbation of order δ is not translated into losses of an order much grater
than δ. This continuity is present in terms of local Ho¨lder continuity, which is a generalization
of local Lipschitz continuity:
Definition 2. A social choice function f is locally Ho¨lder continuous of degree k if for any
θ ∈ Θ there exists a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) ≤ cd(θ′, θ)k.
We have the following result:
Theorem 2. A social choice function f is k-robust if and only if it is locally Ho¨lder contin-
uous of degree k.
Proof. Take any θ ∈ Θ. If f is k-robust then there exists a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for
all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
f(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk.
Assume that there exists a θ¯ ∈ Bδ(θ) such that
lθ(f(θ¯), f(θ)) > cd(θ¯, θ)
k.
Then, there exists a ε¯ > 0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯) if we define δ¯ = d(θ¯, θ) + ε we have
that δ¯ < δˆ and, since δ¯ > d(θ¯, θ), also that θ¯ ∈ Bδ¯(θ). Thus, because f is k-robust we obtain
that
lθ
(
f(θ¯)), f(θ)
)
< cδ¯k
< c(d(θ¯, θ) + ε)k.
Since the inequality above is true for all ε ∈ (0, ε¯):
lθ
(
f(θ¯)), f(θ)
)
≤ cd(θ¯, θ)k,
which represents a contradiction. Therefore, it is true that for all θ ∈ Θ there exists a c > 0
and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
f(θ′)), f(θ)
)
≤ cd(θ′, θ)k.
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This is the definition of local Ho¨lder continuity of degree k.
Assume now that f is locally Ho¨lder continuous of degree k. We have then that for any
θ ∈ Θ there exists a c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for any δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and any θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) ≤ cd(θ′, θ)k.
Since d(θ′, θ) < δ we have that
lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) < cδk
as required.
Note that the definition of local Ho¨lder continuity is made with respect to the metrics
{lθ}θ∈Θ, i.e. taking f to be a function between the two metric spaces (Θ, d)→ (X, lθ) where
θ ∈ Θ is the true type of players. Thus, it could be that if, for instance, X = R, then f is
locally Ho¨lder continuous as a mapping (Θ, d)→ (X, lθ) but not as a mapping (Θ, d)→ (X,E)
where E is the euclidean distance. The metrics {lθ}θ∈Θ measure how far apart in terms of
loses for the designer two different alternatives are while the Euclidean distance measures
how far apart in space two different alternatives are. Thus, if alternatives are compared
using different metrics then the fact that f is Ho¨lder continuous with respect to one metric
does not imply that it is also Ho¨lder continuous with respect to another metric. This situation
arose in the example in Section 2.1.
Theorem 2 states a full characterization of social choice functions. For knowing whether a
social choice function is k-robust or not it is sufficient to study its degree of Ho¨lder continuity.
As we already mentioned, the fact that the notion of k-robustness is linked with a certain
type of continuity is not surprising, as by definition the concept of robustness incorporates
the idea that small perturbations in the given parameters should not lead to big changes in
the alternatives selected by the social choice function.
Next, we focus on social choice functions for which the limited rationality of players
creates no loss (i.e. the set of ∞-robust social choice functions). Before we do that, however,
a new definition is in order:
Definition 3. A social choice function f is locally constant if for all θ there exists a δˆ > 0
such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we have that lθ(f(θ
′), f(θ)) = 0.
Remark 2. A social choice function f is locally constant if and only if it is locally Ho¨lder
continuous of degree ∞.
A consequence of the remark above and Theorem 2 is the following result:
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Corollary 1. A social choice function f is ∞-robust if and only if it is locally constant.
Locally constant social choice functions are frequent in the social choice and mechanism
design literature. As we see in Section 4.1 below, examples of locally constant social choice
functions appear in settings where there is an indivisible object to share amongst some
claimants (i.e. auctions, the Solomon’s Dilemma, etc.). These settings are characterized by
the fact that small perturbation in player’s types do not lead to changes in who the social
choice function allocates the object to. Corollary 1 implies that social choice functions in
these environments are ∞-robust.
4.1 Example: Single Unit Auction
In this section we present an application of Theorem 2 and Corollary 1. Consider an auction
where two bidders N = {1, 2} compete for an indivisible good. The set of alternatives is
X = N ×R where the alternative x = (i, p) represents the situation where player i takes the
item paying a price of p. The player who wins the auction on each allocation x is referred to
as xW . Each bidder i ∈ {1, 2} values the object at θi ∈ R with θ1 6= θ2 (where R is endowed
the euclidean distance) and has a utility is given by the valuation of the item minus the price
he pays in case he wins the auction.16 That is, ui(x, θi) = (θi − p)1xW=i.
The social choice function is given by f(θ) = (1, p) if θ1 > θ2 and f(θ) = (2, p) if θ2 > θ1
for any p ≤ max{θ1, θ2}. This social choice function is implementable by, for instance, the
second price auction.
The loss function is given by lθ(x, y) = h(|θ1− θ2|)1xW 6=yW where h : R+ → R+ is weakly
increasing with h(0) = 0. That is, if both x, y ∈ X prescribe the same winner of the auction
then the loss is zero, otherwise the loss is increasing in the differences in types.
Note that in the environment just defined the social choice function is locally constant.
Indeed, for all θ ∈ Θ if we set δˆ = |θ1−θ2|2 then for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and for all θ
′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we
have that θ1 − θ2 > 0 implies θ
′
1 − θ
′
2 > 0: if θ1 − θ2 > 0 then θ
′
1 − θ
′
2 > θ1 − δ − (θ2 +
δ) = |θ1 − θ2| − 2δ > 0. Similarly, θ1 − θ2 < 0 implies θ
′
1 − θ
′
2 < 0: if θ1 − θ2 < 0 then
θ′1 − θ
′
2 < θ1 + δ − (θ2 − δ) = −|θ1 − θ2| + 2δ < 0. Hence, the allocation when players
missreport their types to θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) is the same allocation as when they report their true
types. Thus, for all θ ∈ Θ and all δ ∈
(
0, |θ1−θ2|2
)
we have that lθ(f(θ), f(θ
′)) = 0 for all
θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ).
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16We are ignoring the case where θ1 = θ2 as in this case it is irrelevant which bidder wins the auction. The
paragraph at the end of this section presents a further discussion for the case where θ1 = θ2.
17Note that f is not defined for θ1 6= θ2 as we have assumed that players’ types are different. Hence f is
locally constant for all its domain without the need for any specific assumptions on what happens around the
17
Remark 3. The social choice function f in the Single Unit Auction is locally constant and,
hence, by Corollary 1 it is ∞-robust.
In this example the fact that the optimal allocation is locally constant implies that slight
changes in the types of players will not change the identity of the bidder who values the
item the most amongst the two bidders. Hence, if the perturbations to players’ types are
insignificant enough, i.e. δ is small enough, then the second price auction still allocates the
item to the bidder that values the item the most.
Note that in this example we deliberative ignored the case where θ1 = θ2. The social
choice function is not locally constant at θ1 = θ2 but this does not represent an issue for the
analysis since if θ1 = θ2 then it is irrelevant which bidder wins the auction and, hence, any
allocation is desirable from the planners’ point of view. That is, when θ1 = θ2 the fact that
bidders misrepresent their types does not create any loss, as in the case where where θ1 6= θ2.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates bounded rationality in mechanism design problems. Bounded ratio-
nality is modeled by assuming that for a given mechanism players behave as if their types were
in a δ-neighborhood of their true types. The designer acknowledges this fact and would like to
know how the alternatives chosen by each mechanism are affected by these δ-perturbations.
To this end, he is endowed with a loss function that evaluates the differences between any two
alternatives given the true types of players. We say that a social choice function is k-robust
if the maximum loss when players misreport their types is of order δk.
In our results we obtain two main conclusions. First, we find that all social choice functions
in quasi-linear utilitarian environments, environments where the role of the designer is to
maximize the sum of the (quasi-linear) utility of players and where the loss function is given
by the differences in sums of utilities, are 2-robust. Second, we find that a social choice
function is k-robust if and only if it is locally Ho¨lder continuous of degree k, and that the
only social choice functions that exhibit maximum robustness to perturbations are those that
are locally constant.
Our results offer new insights on how small perturbations may affect the alternatives cho-
sen by a given mechanism. We include two illustrations in the paper in order to highlight the
applicability of our results. To our knowledge, our paper is the first one to study mechanism
design when players, as the result of their bound rationality, misreport their types
points where θ1 = θ2.
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Appendix
The result in Lemma 1 is a direct consequence of the revelation principle result stated in
Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. A social choice function f is k-robust with mechanism (M, g) if and only if
it is k-robust with mechanism (Θ, f).
Proof. If f is k-robust with mechanism (Θ, f) then it is trivially k-robust with some mecha-
nism (M, g), simply set (M, g) = (Θ, f).
To prove the other direction of the implication, first note that condition (i) of the definition
of k-robust is always satisfied by any social choice function that is implementable.18 Thus,
we are left to prove condition (ii) of the definition of k-robustness.
If f is k-robust with mechanism (M, g) then we have that for all θ ∈ Θ there exists a
c > 0 and a δˆ > 0 such that for all δ ∈ (0, δˆ) and all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ)
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
< cδk
Given that f is k-robust with a mechanism (M, g), using condition (i) of the definition of
k-robustness it is true that for any θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) we have that g(s
∗(θ′)) = f(θ′) and, hence,
lθ
(
g(s∗(θ′)), f(θ)
)
= lθ
(
f(θ′), f(θ)
)
.
Therefore, combining the two expressions above:
lθ
(
f(θ′), f(θ)
)
< cδk
for all θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ).
Thus, in the direct mechanism (Θ, f) where players truthfully report their types θ and
these are perturbed to θ′ ∈ Bδ(θ) the loss is bounded by cδ
k.
18We assume that f is implementable, see the section 2.
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